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Judicial review with respect to international trade disputes may occur
on two different levels. The first level, that of public international law,
has been strengthened by the recent World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements and is concerned with serving and protecting the rights and
obligations of states. On the second, or national level, individuals may
pursue the rights accorded them in their national court systems by the
legislation which implemented such international rules.
The potential exists that the rights and interests of both states and
individuals may be involved on each level. On the international level, one
may discover a hidden dispute involving individual rights.' And the
reverse may be true: a case litigated before national courts may have as
its background an existing or upcoming dispute among states.
One example may suffice to demonstrate the problem. With regard
to the determination of "injury" within the realm of antidumping, indi-
viduals-importers, exporters or the relevant industry-may challenge a
determination on the national level. However, a parallel process involving
the same substantial question and involving the same interests may
simultaneously come before a GATT panel, in which the only parties are
the governments of the respective WTO Members.2 While the issues and
facts involved in each process are substantially the same, significantly
different rules apply in each case. Whereas the national court has at its
disposal all the usual judicial tools for verifying the facts presented by the
investigating governmental authorities,3 the respective panel is supposed
to base its findings only on the relevant facts as they are presented by the
administration of the WTO Member which has imposed the antidumping
I. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organi-
zation and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948, 31 C.M.L.R. 1157,
at 1190 (1994) (refers to the "secondary disputes" of a domestic policy nature).
2. A telling example may be the Chilled Salmon case under GATr. Panel Report on
United States Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic
Salmon from Norway, 1 HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 593a (Apr. 27,
1994). For other cases dealt with on both levels see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Settlement of
International and National Trade Disputes Through the GATT, in 7 PUPIL 77 (Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Gunther Jaenicke eds., 1992).
3. See the detailed rules in Article 6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of GATT 1994 on evidence to be observed by the investigation national authorities.
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duty.4 Though the panel may call experts under Article 13 DSU, it seems
obvious that, given the time constraints, their findings will have a much
more limited scope and effect than those of the national authorities.
Basically, panels are designed to act as an appellate body and thus not
exercise a second full investigation of the factual situation.5
These two levels also exist in other fields of international relations
where procedures for judicial review are provided and different methods
for linking them have evolved. The most prominent examples are the
European Community's legal system and the system under the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The following study represents a consideration of some aspects of the
interaction and linkage between national courts and international dispute
settlement bodies. Thus, it will focus on the role of national courts in
international trade relations and indicate links with the dispute settlement
process on the international level within the WTO.
The relationship between national and international dispute resolution
bodies was not a prominent issue in the Uruguay Round debates concern-
ing the enforcement of international trade law rules.6 However, the
positive results of the Uruguay Round have led to a considerable expan-
sion of international trade. In this context, the question of guaranteeing
effective legal protection of the rights and interests of the individual in
the international trading system is a matter of vital interest, worthy of
analysis in order to spur academic discussion.
Part I of this article identifies and analyzes some modern trends in
judicial review in the area of international relations. Section Part II then
examines and briefly discusses the existence of judicial review for both
national and international levels of protection and the possibilities for
linking the two. A major part, Part III, is devoted to the specific role of
national courts within the WTO system. Finally, Part IV draws conclu-
sions and suggests some means for improving the judicial review offered
by national courts and for linking them to the interstate dispute settlement
on the international level.
4. See Petersmann, supra note 1, at 1241. See also Chilled Salmon, supra note 2, referring
to Article 17.6(i) of the Antidumping Agreement limiting the role of the panel "to determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and their evaluation . . . unbiased
and objective." In addition, Article 13 DSU states the right of the panel to "seek information"
and to "consult experts." See likewise Article XX of the Agreement on Government Procure-
ment providing for a judicial challenge procedure in case of complaints by suppliers.
5. For exceptions see David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATT's Role in an Era of Increasing Conflict, in 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1145 (1993).
6. See, e.g., ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).
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I. RECENT TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
In national legal systems, as well as in the framework of international
trade relations, one may discover some recent trends in protecting the
rights of individuals by judicial review. All of these trends reflect an
improvement of the various procedures for the effective protection of the
rights of individuals.
A. Effective Judicial Review in
National Legal Systems
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) sets
forth as a fundamental human right an individual's right to access to a
fair and impartial judicial system. This right has become most prominent
within the case law developed under the ECHR.7
This basic guarantee is limited in scope to civil rights and criminal
charges. The language suggests that this right does not extend to the field
of administrative actions. However, the European Court on Human Rights
has applied ECHR Article 6 to some aspects of administrative actions.8
At its core, ECHR Article 6 constitutes not only a fundamental right, but
expresses at the same time a general principle of law. Basic judicial
protection of the individual is part of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip)
which is present in nearly all modem constitutions. Thus, basic judicial
protection is guaranteed absolutely within the scope of purely domestic
affairs in most modem societies.
However, whenever external or international elements become
involved, it is unclear to what extent judicial review by domestic courts
is available with respect to state actions which are covered by interna-
tional rules. Particularly in the field of international trade relations, the
basic question is whether individuals-and thus national courts, via the
individual's right to judicial review-should be allowed to insert them-
selves in the realm of international trade relations, especially within the
WTO. As examples from the legal systems of the European Community
and the United States show, either the national legislature implementing
the WTO tends to restrict the role of national courts or these courts them-
selves tend to show a large degree of judicial self restraint.
7. "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law." Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 1, 1 EUR. CONV. HUM. RTs. 1, 8.
8. Golsong/Karl/Miehsler/Petzold a.o., Kommentar zur Europaiischen Menschenrechts-
konvention (Looseleaf service 1995), Art. 6, paras. 80-85, 149-181; JOCHEN FROWEIN &
WOLFGANG PEUKERT, EUROPAISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION 108 (2d ed. 1996).
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The fundamental rights issue may be extended to a constitutional
right of the individual to do business in international markets. 9 Relevant
fundamental rights are the freedom of profession, the right to equal
treatment, the protection of property, and the more general right to
develop one's own personality and to engage in activities which may be
relevant to international trade. Accordingly, courts have derived a funda-
mental right to export or import in this context.'0 The European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in the bananas case of October 5, 1994, referred to the right
to property and the freedom to pursue trade or business as part of the
general principles of Community law. 1 However, the ECJ held that these
rights must be viewed in relation to their social function. Especially in
foreign trade relations and agricultural policy, the ECJ acknowledged a
specific and broad discretionary power of the Community institutions. 2
In this context, the ECJ applies a test of proportionality.' 3 It would
be difficult to conceive that every interference by the public authority
may be challenged under the claim of a violation of fundamental rights.
This would not be so in the case of an act involving aspects of interna-
tional trade relations.'4
This basic protection of fundamental rights within international trade
relations is only applicable within a given trade policy. The individual
certainly has no right to demand a specific trade policy with regard to
foreign markets. However, as soon as the competent authorities establish
a specific policy or market-organization, the individual has a right to be
treated at least in accordance with the basic rule of non-discrimination.
Another trend relates to the implementation of international rules
within domestic legal systems. In the EC as well as other contexts, the
9. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 3, 14 (Meinhard Hilf &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Limited Government and
Unlimited Trade Policy Powers? Why Effective Judicial Review of Foreign Trade Restrictions
Depends on Individual Rights, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra, at 537, 542. See also Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic
Law, 3 PUPIL 1, 387 (1991).
10. Petersmann, Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Powers, supra note 9, at 545
(referring to the respective situation in Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and within the
EC).
11. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 1-4974-78.
12. Case 52/81, Faust v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 3745.
13. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb.7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) art.
3(b)(3) (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter ECT].
14. See Jacques Steenbergen, Is There a Need for Constitutional Reform of Foreign Trade
Law of the EEC?, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 9, at 563; Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Trade
Policy-Making Institutions and Procedures in the European Community, in Hilf & Petersmann,
supra note 9, at 175; Petersmann, Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Powers, supra note
9, at 537.
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national judge appears to be the genuine enforcer of international rules.
"Deconcentrated enforcement" by national courts tends to be much more
effective in protecting individual rights than the international dispute
settlement mechanisms which are primarily concerned with the legal
disputes among governments rather than with private rights and inter-
ests. 15 The effectiveness of international institutions is highly dependent
upon an effective implementation of their international rules by and
within national legal systems. 6 It is in the self-interest of the WTO and
other international organizations who set and apply international rules,
that these rules be applied as effectively as possible to the grass-root
relations of the individual operators. The more national courts become
involved in the implementation of international rules, the more the
relevant international institutions will gain domestic political support and
thus, legitimacy. Only such support can guarantee effective implementa-
tion and faithful compliance in the long run. Such support is essential for
the legitimization of new international rules. Accordingly, international-
ism should have its firm roots at home.'
7
A further trend concerns the judicial protection of individuals with
respect to violations of international trading rules by foreign governments.
Judicial review of one's own government's behavior regarding interna-
tional trading rules is commonly available. However, as discussed below
in detail, hardly any member of the WTO allows individuals to base such
claims against their own government on GATT law, because GATT law
is not considered to be directly applicable. Nevertheless, where its own
government is acting unlawfully, the individual usually will find adequate
judicial protection under domestic law.
Where acts of foreign governments are at issue, however, judicial
protection is not so readily available. Many states still maintain discrimi-
natory rules with regard to foreigners' access to their justice systems. 8
Where an individual has a dispute with a foreign government, three
different avenues of relief may be considered:
15. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Ein Pladoyer fir die dezentrale Kontrolle der Anwendung
des Gemeinschaftsrechts durch die Mitgliedstaaten, in LIBER AMICORUM PESCATORE 205
(Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987).
16. Hudec, supra note 6, at 358.
17. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Foreword to MEINHARD HILF & ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1991).
18. The most prominent example is the GATT case relating to Section 337 of the U.S.
Tariff Act. Pierre Pescatore et al., Panel Report on Case 74 adopted on November 7, 1989, 1
HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATI' DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 158 (1995). See also, Case 20/92, Anthony
Hubbard v. Peter Hamburger, 1993 E.C.R. 1-3777.
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(1) The most common method would be to force one's own domestic
government to use all instruments at its disposal to pressure the foreign
government (for example, U.S. Section 301 or EC Regulation on the New
Commercial Policy Instrument (now known as The Trade Barriers
Regulation)).19 This kind of diplomatic protection, which constitutes a
more or less aggressive unilateralism in which even national courts can
become involved, often raises problems of fair representation of the
foreign governments concerned.
(2) The second avenue is to seek redress in the national courts of the
foreign state. For example, in the still ongoing Kodak/Fuji case, the
Japanese have urged Kodak to pursue its claims before the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission and to use all judicial means under Japanese law
rather than to look for protection under U.S. law and its authorities.
(3) Finally, an individual may join her own government in pursuing
a case before the GATT dispute settlement process. Apparently, an
increasing number of governments are becoming willing to let private
parties lend support to the drafting of the submissions to the relevant
panels. However, joining the government's representation during the oral
part of the panel proceedings still seems to be excluded. 20
These trends seem to suggest an increasing importance of judicial
review in international trade relations. However, as will be discussed in
Part II, one can observe trends which point in the opposite direction when
governments get the impression that their national courts are interfering
too intensively with their trade policies.
This increased importance of judicial review in domestic law is
reflected in the expansion of binding dispute settlement procedures under
public international law. The most recent example of this is the establish-
ment of the War Crimes Tribunals in The Hague.2 1 In the field of human
19. See Council Regulation 3286/94 of December 22, 1994, laying down Community
procedures in the field of Common Commercial Policy (trade barriers regulation), 1994 O.J.
(L 349) 71. See also Rainer Bierwagen, EG-Schutz vor unterlaubten Handelspolitiken durch
Drittlander, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 201 (1996); Peter Van den Bossche,
The European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements, in IMPLEMENTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND 3, 93 (John Jackson & Alan Sykes eds., forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on
file).
20. Compare for the U.S., David Leebron, Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results
in the United States, in Jackson & Sykes, supra note 19, at 256. For a critical approach of the
"notoriously undemocratic" dispute settlement procedure under GATT denying access to
individuals who may be directly concerned with the outcome of the proceedings see Robert
Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699,
711 (1994); and G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995).
21. The U.N. Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the
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rights protection, the international mechanisms for judicial review have
gained momentum. 22 The same can be stated with respect to the interna-
tional administrative tribunals: more than fifty of about three hundred
international governmental organizations have already accepted such
jurisdiction for the judicial protection of a total of 120,000-150,000 civil
servants.23
The following section will examine whether these recent trends favor-
ing judicial protection of the individual in the general field of international
relations are confirmed in the specific field of international trade relations.
B. Effective Judicial Review in
International Trade Relations
The facilitation of effective implementation of international trade
rules, including increased legal certainty and transparency, was a primary
goal of the Uruguay Round.24 To the surprise of many, a major success
of the Uruguay Round consisted of the considerable strengthening of the
rules for international dispute settlement within the WTO.25 Governments
willingly closed easy escape routes by renouncing their right to veto the
establishment of a panel or the adoption of final GATT Council deci-
26 esalsmn asions. The establishment of a standing Appellate Body also underscores
the WTO members' strong commitment to legal reform, which will
render it more difficult for parties to escape the legal decisions under
GATT law.
Despite providing for strengthened GATT rules to ensure effective
enforcement of decisions, the Uruguay Round did not, in general terms,
address the role of national courts in international trade dispute resolution.
This was not surprising, given that virtually no treaties involving public
international law provide specific rules for their implementation by
national judicial bodies. It is generally recognized, however, that contract-
ing states have a great deal of discretion in how they may choose to
respond to their obligations under an agreement.
Former Yugoslavia (JCTY) under chapter VII, Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER
art. 39.
22. See, for example, the U.S. signing of human rights treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, cited in Leebron, supra note 20, at 218.
23. Ingo Winkelmann, Colloque de la Socit Frangaise pour le Droit International
(S.F.D.J.), 11 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 1088 (1995).
24. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of September 20, 1986 at Punta del
Este, reprinted in HILF & PETERSMANN, supra note 17, at 580.
25. See Petersmann, supra note 1, at 1205.
26. HUDEC, supra note 6, at 363.
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Despite the absence of an overarching rule, the Uruguay Round
agreements do contain a number of specific clauses concerning how each
member implements the agreements domestically. These specific clauses
are aimed at ensuring a more efficient operation of each agreement by
providing for specific administrative and judicial review procedures
within the national legal order.27 The most detailed provisions to this
effect are to be found in Articles 41-50 of the Trade in Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) Agreement, providing for "expeditious remedies" to
prevent infringements and for a review procedure by national judicial
authorities.
However, none of these clauses address the specific role of national
courts and the functioning of judicial review with respect to the fights of
the individual. This has been left entirely to the discretion of the members
of WTO. Furthermore, as will be shown below, under neither U.S. nor
EC law are national courts supposed to apply GATT rules directly.
However, under certain circumstances, courts do tend to construe national
trade law to conform with GATT law.
Before examining in more detail the specific role of national courts
in international trade relations, it may be useful to consider other judicial
review systems which exist in international and national law, and to
determine to what extent the two levels are linked to one another.
II. THE Two-LEVELS APPROACH OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND METHODS OF LINKAGE
Aside from international trade law, a vast array of procedures have
developed in which individuals have standing on the international level
to defend either their individual rights or international rules which have
an impact on the individual. Given the number of different international
and domestic procedures, and the broad variety of problems which exist
regarding coordination or linkage between the two levels, it is nearly
impossible to systematize the procedures and their problems. One may
demonstrate the possible elements of linkages between the two levels
through the use of a sliding scale. One end may be referred to as "no
linkage at all," and the other would contain a model which provides for
27. One example is the "Independent Entity" established in 1995 by the WTO, the
International Chamber of Commerce and the International Federation of Inspection Agencies
and administrated by the WTO, which became operational on May 1, 1996 and which is the
first WTO dispute settlement mechanism open to private traders. For further examples see
Petersmann, supra note 1, at 1187-88. See also Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, reprinted in, GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 296 (1994).
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complete coordination between the two extremes, with either ex ante- or
ex post-control of the various decisions of national courts on the interna-
tional level. To be specific, one may distinguish between the following
five models or methods of linkage.
A. No Linkage at All
A great number of dispute settlement procedures under public
international law have no immediate impact on the legal status of the
individual. They involve primarily, or exclusively, the interests of states
or international organizations. This seems to be the traditional under-
standing of the GATT dispute settlement procedures, which aim at
safeguarding trading rights or opportunities of the contracting parties of
GATT, now the Members of the WTO.
As provided under ECHR Article 24 or ECT Article 173 (2), each
High Contracting Party or Member State may file claims against each
other within an interstate procedure. While the procedures under the
ECHR are especially focused on protecting individual human rights, and
even the state interests involved under ECT Article 173 (2) may have
some indirect impact on the legal situation of individuals, there seems to
be practically no link to the parallel process of judicial review on the
national level. One exception may be where a national court of a High
Contracting Party of the ECHR failed to fulfill its obligation of guaran-
teeing effective judicial review of the individual. It was precisely in this
situation that the Netherlands and others filed a state complaint against
Greece under ECHR Article 24.28
Although individuals may have some substantive interests in the
outcome of such interstate procedures because the rules in question may
eventually be applied under different circumstances in a case before
domestic courts, no legal avenue is available to individuals who would
seek to influence these interstate procedures. There is no procedural link
which might avoid discrepancies in the interpretation of the same legal
rule either.at the international or national level. Each system seems to be
"self-contained," operating without external influences and serving
obviously different purposes: inter-state interests on the one hand and the
individual's interests on the other.
B. Consecutively Operating Systems
Typical examples of this category include some of the international
mechanisms for the protection of human rights. The various international
28. See FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra note 8, at 112.
[Vol. 18:321
Winter 1997] National Courts in International Trade Relations 331
conventions which contain systems for judicial review by an international
body in the case of human rights violations generally require prior
exhaustion of local remedies. Thus, under ECHR Article 26,29 an individ-
ual may only turn to the European Court of Human Rights (the Court)
following the exhaustion of all remedies available under national law.
In these situations there are two links, one substantive and one
procedural. From a substantive perspective certain fundamental rights
are guaranteed in the international instrument. These rights must be
respected within the legal systems of all contracting parties. For exam-
ple, in most domestic systems the ECHR is directly applicable;.in some
countries the ECHR even has constitutional stature.3 ° Judgments and
interpretations given on the international level immediately influence
judicial protection on the domestic level. However, if controversies and
unresolved issues arise in a specific case pending on the national level,
no procedural means exist by which to call for a preliminary ruling on
the international level. Rather, all local remedies must first be exhausted
before the relevant issue can be brought to the Court. 3' The final
decision of an international institution such as the Court cannot overrule
the final domestic decision, but the state in question has the obligation
to follow the Court's ruling (restitutio in integrum) and eventually to
pay compensation.3 2 Despite the absence of a formal hierarchy, the
29. When Protocol no. 11, envisaging a reform of the control machinery under the
European Convention on Human Rights-signed in Strasbourg on May 11, 1994-comes into
force, the text of many provisions of the ECHR will be amended. The exhaustion of local
remedies will then be provided for in Article 34 of the amended version of the ECHR. For
more detailed analysis of the amendments to the ECHR by Protocol no. 11, see, e.g., Andrew
Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Grundziige des neuen EMRK-Kontrollmechanismus
nach dem am 11. Mai 1994 unterzeichneten Reform-Protokoll (Nr. 11), 21 EuGRZ 317 (1994);
and Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery under the European Convention on
Human Rights: Protocol no. 11, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1995).
30. Georg Ress, The ECHR and State Parties: The Legal Effect of Judgments Of The
European Court of Human Rights On The Internal Law and Before Domestic Courts Of The
Contracting States, in PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 209, 240-69 (Irene Maier
ed., 1980); Jorg Polakiewicz & Valdrie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human Rights Convention
in Domestic Law: the Impact of Strasbourg Case-law in States where Direct Effect is given to
the Convention, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 65, 125-26 (1991). As to the domestic status of the
Convention in each Contracting Party see ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 59-191 (1983).
31. Cf. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 46.
32. See DIETER KILIAN, DIE BINDUNGSWIRKUNG DER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES EUROPAI-
SCHEN GERICHTSHOFS FUR MENSCHENRECHTE AUF DIE NATIONALEM GERICHTE DER MITGLIED-
STAATER DER KONVENTION ZUM SCHUTZE DER MENSCHENRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN,
113 (1994); FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra note 8, at 450; Albert Bleckmann, Bundes-
verfassungsgericht versus Europtiischer Gerichtshof fir Menschenrechte, 22 EuGRZ 387
(1995); PIETER VAN DiK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 146 (1984).
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development of international case law will influence future jurispru-
dence on the national level.33
C. Parallel or Alternative Judicial Review
It would be unusual to find an international or a national system of
judicial review which would offer both levels as parallel or alternative
means for judicial review. An example of such a system could be the
various mechanisms for the protection of human rights. However, these
all involve exhaustion of domestic remedies as a prerequisite to seeking
redress on the international level. Accordingly, an individual can not
bypass the national judicial system.
Under EC law an individual has a multitude of different procedures
at his disposal for challenging the legality of acts taken by EC institu-
tions. Nonetheless, the relevant treaties determine with strict precision
which level should be pursued first. There are only two minor exceptions.
First, the situation may arise in which the Community and a Member
State are simultaneously dealing with a presumed infringement of compe-
tition law. As a result, the same situation may be dealt with either at the
supranational or at the national level. The ECJ has ruled that in excep-
tional cases such parallel actions may proceed, but that the rule "ne bis
in idem" would apply in order that the individual involved would not be
penalized twice for one offence under the antitrust laws.34
The other situation offering a choice between the jurisdictions of
either the ECJ or the courts of a Member State is that of disputes in-
volving contracts under public or private law to which the European
Community is a party. Here judicial review is available at the level speci-
fied by the contract in question (ECT Article 181).
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) offers a choice
of two alternative methods for access to judicial review. Under Article
1904(5) of the Agreement, private parties may challenge final adminis-
trative determinations in the field of antidumping or countervailing duty
actions through either an action before the competent domestic courts or
by requesting review by a binational arbitration panel. The latter alterna-
tive may save time and money, while appearing more favorable than
appearing before a foreign judge.
33. Rudolf Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 36 (J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993); Petersmann, supra
note 1, at 1240. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field
of Antidumping Law, 28 C.M.L.R. 69, 91; Bleckmann, supra note 32, at 387.
34. Case 14/68, Wilhelm, 1961 E.C.R., 1; Case 7/72, B6hringer, 1972 E.C.R., 1281, 1280.
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Once a proceeding is before an arbitration panel, one may not
challenge its final determination in any domestic court. With regard to
future proceedings, the decision of such a panel is not binding authority.
NAFTA, unlike EC law, does not allow domestic courts to ask a panel
or court on the international level for binding preliminary opinions. There
is one embryonic provision allowing the contracting parties of NAFTA
to reach a common interpretation of the Agreement whenever such
interpretation is at issue in a domestic judicial or administrative proceed-
ing.3
5
D. Systems of Integrated Judicial Review
A multitude of links between the international and the national levels
may be found in legal systems which aim at integrating certain fields of
state authority. The prime example of this is the European Community.
Certain similar mechanisms in the functioning of judicial review, howev-
er, have also been adopted by the Andean Pact. Two basic features
predominate:
(1) First, the European Community possesses no hierarchical powers
to overrule or nullify any court decisions on the national level. This is
considered to be the main difference between the structure of the Com-
munity and that of a federal system, where, at least in questions of federal
law, a supreme court has authority to overrule lower court decisions.
Even where a national court in deciding a question of EC law violates an
individual's rights, that individual has no procedural standing to challenge
this national decision before any court of the European Community. The
individual's only options are either to informally petition the Commission
to open a procedure under ECT Article 169 against the Member State in
question, or to petition the European Parliament under ECT Article
138(d). These remedies do not seem to be very effective. The EC Com-
mission, despite broad discretion over the use of this procedure, has to
date never brought a claim before the ECJ over a national court decision,
obviously out of deference to the independence of the judiciary.36 Even
if the Commission pursued this procedure, the ECJ would only be
empowered to state that the Member State had violated EC law. In
addition it could also impose financial sanctions against the Member State
35. See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 2020 (corresponding to the former
FTA art. 1808).
36. Geiger, EG-Vertrag (1995), art. 169 para. 4.
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in question under ECT Article 171:3. The individual could then file a
claim in the domestic court in question, claiming damages pursuant to
state responsibility for its institutions which have violated EC law. 37
(2) The second basic feature is the guarantee that EC law will be uni-
formly interpreted and applied throughout the Community. National
courts have the opportunity to turn to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on
any question of EC law which arises in a domestic court proceeding.
Where the particular national court is deciding in the last instance, it must
seek such a preliminary ruling on EC law questions under ECT Article
177. Such ECJ rulings are limited to questions of EC law and are in
principle only binding on the court that posed the question. Despite the
theoretical limitation on the extent to which such a ruling is binding, its
precedential value is in fact of much broader scope since it is obvious
that all national courts throughout the Community are obligated to follow
ECJ precedents on questions of EC law. 38
Consequently, national courts are called upon to render decisions
based on EC law even though their primary task is to resolve questions
of domestic law. In contrast, EC courts never directly decide questions of
national law. While there exists a formal separation between the two
levels of law, European and domestic, in cases of conflict between the
two EC law will always prevail over domestic law in the sense that
domestic law will be inapplicable.
E. Individual Involvement on the International Level
Traditionally, judicial review for aggrieved individuals has only been
available on the national level, with international procedures being
reserved for States. 39 Nevertheless, individuals may have a vital interest
in influencing the interstate procedure in view of the possible conse-
quences which it may have for the judicial review provided on the
national level. A typical development in this sense took place in the
framework of the ECHR, where the position of the individual gradually
improved in the course of its jurisprudence.
Even the early cases recognized the individual's right to participate
in the oral hearing before the Court as an assistant of the Commission.
In 1982, an applicant was even allowed to act as a party during the
37. See Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R., 1-5357;
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur, EuZW 1996, p. 205.
38. See Manfred A. Dauses, Aufgabenteilung und judizieller Dialog zwischen den einzel-
straatlichen Gerichten und dem EuGH, I FESTSCHRIFT EVERLING, 223 (1995).
39. The access of individuals to the ECJ under Article 173 to challenge decisions under
EC law may not be considered as an international procedure in the given context. EC TREATY
art. 173(4).
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proceedings whenever a case was submitted to the Court by the Com-
mission or a State. 4° Yet, the present text of the Convention excludes the
individual from directly addressing the Court .
The individual's legal status will be improved with the coming into
force of the amendments to the ECHR, as provided for in Protocol No.
11, signed on May 11, 1994. Article 34 of the envisaged version of the
ECHR, which includes these amendments, entitles the individual to file
a claim before the European Court of Human Rights directly.42
Moreover, according to the amended version of ECHR Article 36, as
provided for in Protocol No. 11, the President of the European Court of
Human Rights may allow third parties that have an interest in the results
of a pending procedure to submit written statements or to participate in
oral hearings. Under the European Community's judicial review system
an individual has standing to defend his or her rights before the ECJ
within every preliminary procedure. Only in interstate proceedings, such
as under ECT Article 173:2, or in infringement procedures under ECT
Article 169, does the individual have no standing at all.
Other procedures exist, such as the ICSID Convention's dispute
resolution procedure which explicitly offers the private investor a judicial
forum for disputes with the state with which an investment contract has
been concluded.43
III. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS WITHIN THE WTO
Having reviewed the great variety of methods of linkage within the
two-level-protection of individual rights, a closer look shall be given to
the field of international trade relations within the system of the
WTO/GATT in the following sections.
Generally speaking, the two levels of protection of individual rights
within the WTO framework are similar to those of prior international
structures: a newly reinforced dispute settlement procedure within the
WTO on the one hand, and judicial review by national courts on the
other. As discussed below, almost none of the previously identified links
between these two levels are present within the WTO system. There is
no recognized rule on the exhaustion of local remedies, national courts
40. Rudolf Bernhardt, supra note 29.
41. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 48, in I EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (H. Miehsler & H. Petzold
eds., 1982).
42. See Art. 34 of the envisaged version of the ECHR including the amendments as
provided for in Protocol no. 11, in: 21 EuGRZ 339, 343 (1994). See also Bernhardt, supra
note 29, at 145.
43. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States, Oct, 14, 1966, art. 25, 1 ICSID REPORTS 3, 9 (1993).
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are unable to call for a preliminary ruling or interpretation from a higher
body in cases of unclear rules under GATT, and individuals have no
access to the international dispute settlement procedure. This means that
there is no institutional linkage between the two levels of judicial pro-
tection, creating a danger that divergent interpretations of GATT law will
occur at each level.
The following analysis of national courts under the WTO will
demonstrate that they have a limited role, because national implementing
legislation generally does not allow the courts to apply GATT law
directly. This Part will then be concluded by a review of possible options
for future development.
A. The Role of National Courts under WTO Agreements
WTO Members are obliged to implement WTO agreements and to
perform duties according to them." As with most treaties under public
international law, Members retain a great deal of discretion over how
they choose to implement WTO agreements (through domestic legislation
or other means). For example, options include setting up governmental
regulatory bodies or conferring private rights of action on individuals. As
discussed above, the WTO agreements mention the role of national
courts in only a few exceptional cases.45 It seems that states have mainly
exercised their flexibility in choosing implementation methods by adapt-
ing their given legislation in the field of international trade and by
entrusting their executives with broad discretionary powers in the area of
safeguarding trade interests."
B. The Role of National Courts as Defined
in the Implementing Legislation
The role of national courts with regard to enforcing GATT law can
take one of two forms, depending upon which of two avenues a state
chooses in formulating its implementing legislation. The choice is
between allowing courts to directly apply GATT law in cases involving
individual rights, or allowing them to apply GATT law only indirectly.
Only in the first instance will the executive handling trade matters be
under strict scrutiny by domestic courts. Both the United States and the
44. There is no option to choose compensation or even retaliation instead of due imple-
mentation. See the persuasive statement by John Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60
(1997), in response to the opposite view of Judith Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416 (1996).
45. See supra note 27.
46. For an overview, see generally Jackson & Sykes, supra note 19.
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European Community have rarely allowed their domestic courts to
directly apply GATT law based upon requests from individuals.47
1. Direct Application of GATT Law
There seems to be virtually no national legal system which would
consider GATT rules to be directly applicable in domestic law. For
example, the EC Council, in the preamble of its Decision of December
22, 1994, on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements, stated
that these are, by their nature, not susceptible of being invoked in
Community or Member States' courts.48 In nearly identical terms the U.S.
implementing legislation stated that "no provision of any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements ... that is inconsistent with any law of the United
States shall have effect" and that no person other than the United States
"shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements" or challenge "any action or inaction ... on the
ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent" with one of those
agreements. 49 Likewise, the Japanese courts, in practice, follow the same
approach.5° These statements emphasize that the WTO's establishment
should not, in this regard, alter the status quo as it had developed under
the GATT since 1947. 51
The most prominent example of GATT law not being directly
applicable within a national, or in this case supra-national, system is the
recent line of ECJ decisions. This approach will be discussed in depth as
it involves a number of important aspects which may likewise be consid-
ered in the context of the legal orders of other WTO Members.
47. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992). As to the United States, see the critical assessment by Ronald
Brand, The Status of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade in United State Domestic
Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990).
48. Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion on Behalf of the European Community,
as Regards Matters Within Its Competence, of Agreements Reached in the Uruguay Round
Multilateral Negotiations, 1994 O.J. (L 336) 2. The Commission's proposal took the same ap-
proach. Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion of the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-94), COM(94) 143 final at 5a.
Zonnekeyn, The Direct Effect of GATT in Community Law: From International Fruit Company
to the Bananas Case, 2 INT'L TRADE L. AND REG. 63, 71 (1996).
49. See H.R. 5110, 103d. Cong. § 102(a)(1) (approving the implementing trade agree-
ments concluded in the Uruguay Round of the multilateral trade negotiations); and H.R. 5110
103d. Cong. §103(c)(l)(A) and (B). See also Leebron, supra note 20, at 252. As to the status
of GATT in U.S. law prior to the establishment of the WTO, see Hudec, supra note 6, at 356,
as well as the less restrictive assessment by Brand, supra note 47, at 506.
50. Yuji Iwasawa, Implementation of International Trade Agreements in Japan, in Hilf &
Petersmann, supra note 9, at 299; see Yuji Iwasawa, Constitutional Problems Involved in
Implementing the Uruguay Round. Japan, in Jackson & Sykes, supra note 19, at 202.
51. For references on comparative law, see Jackson, supra note 44.
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In the case of the EC, the most relevant cases at present concern the
import of bananas from other WTO Members. 2 In these cases, EC
Regulation No. 404/93 of February 1993, which established a common
market organization of the bananas market, had come under attack for
protecting the EC-based banana producers and discriminating against
third states' producers in violation of general principles of GATT,
especially of Articles I, II and III. Here the ECJ confirmed its prior case
law, which excludes any direct application of GATT law with respect to
individuals. In its judgment of October 5, 1994, the ECJ for the first time
considered cases in which Member State governments attacked Council
regulations on the ground that they violated existing GATT law. The ECJ
ruled that, in spite of ECT Article 228 paragraph 7, which binds the
Community institutions to respect international agreements, even Member
States outvoted by a majority in the EC Council in the context of a
decision under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) will have no
possibility of invoking a violation of GATT law by EC secondary law.
The ECJ adopted this rather radical and restrictive approach based on
arguments contained within its prior decisions in this area. The lines of
reasoning upon which the decisions are based are open to significant
criticism5 3
a) The Case Law of the ECJ
In summarizing its prior case law, the ECJ reached four basic conclu-
sions:
(1) The provisions of GATT law have the effect of binding the
Community, but in assessing the scope of GATT in the Community's
legal system and its special features, GATT law cannot be considered
to be directly applicable in the domestic legal systems of the con-
tracting parties as this would not correspond to the spirit, legal
scheme, and terms of the GATT.
(2) GATT law, according to the principle of negotiations undertaken
on the basis of "reciprocal and mutual advantageous arrangements"
amongst the contracting parties, is characterized by its great flex-
52. Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of European Union (Banan-
as), 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973; Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, discussed in 7 EuZW 118 (1996);
Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v. Procluktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
1972 E.C.R. 1219.
53. See Werner Meng, Gedanken zur Frage unmittelbarer Anwendung von WTO-Recht in
der EG, FESTSCHRIFT FOR BERNHARDT 1063 (1995); see generally John Jackson, Status of
Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 321 (1992).
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ibility of provisions, by conferring the possibility of derogations and
by allowing unilateral measures to be taken in exceptional
difficulties.
(3) The rules on the settlement of disputes between the contracting
parties-and not concerning individual rights or interests-contain a
high degree of flexibility and are aimed also at reciprocal and mutu-
ally advantageous solutions.
(4) GATT Article XIX gives the contracting parties power to unilat-
erally suspend their obligations and to withdraw or modify conces-
sions.
On the basis of these particular features of GATT, the ECJ concluded
that neither an individual within the Community, nor a Member State can
invoke GATT law in order to challenge the lawfulness of a Community
act. According to the Court, it depends entirely on the intent of the
Community's institutions whether in the process of implementation they
wanted to expressly refer to specific provisions of GATT, thus giving the
Court the possibility to review the lawfulness of the Community act in
question. It is not the role of the ECJ or of national courts to determine
the commercial policies of the EC with respect to GATT. A continuing
process of negotiation has to go on in order to achieve and maintain the
reciprocal and mutual advantageous balance under the GATT system.
The ECJ thus seems to accept a judicial restraint with respect to the
given division of powers in the field of foreign economic relations.
b) Critical Assessment
This previously solidified case law, which is not entirely consistent
or even definitive, and only relates to the GATT prior to the WTO, has
been criticized by a number of commentators as well as by some national
courts.
First, it may be noted that the ECJ does not refuse ab ovo the con-
cept of direct application of international agreements. For example, the
ECJ has held that treaties with third states which are closely linked to the
European Community by an agreement on cooperation or association
may be directly applicable.-4 The obvious reason for this is that in these
cases, the European Community can rely on the performance of the
respective third state within the framework of the given treaty. This
54. Case 104/81, Hauptzollant Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. 3641; Case 12/86,
Meryen Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gniind, 1987 E.C.R. 3719; Case 87/75, Conceria Daniele
Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, 1976 E.C.R. 129.
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situation may suffice to guarantee the necessary reciprocity in the appli-
cation of the given treaty. In allowing direct application of such agree-
ments, the ECJ apparently takes no notice of whether the treaty in
question contains safeguards clauses, stricter dispute settlement proce-
dures than those of GATT, or is subject to alteration by unanimous
decisions.
Structurally, there are no significant differences between the GATT
legal system and the third-country treaties which the ECJ is willing to
apply directly. The aforementioned elements exist in both-unless one
would give a particular consideration to the fact that GATT was based
only on a Protocol of Provisional Application recognized so-called
"grandfather" rights and had not even been duly signed and ratified by
the EC. The ECJ does not put emphasis on these specific features of
GATT. Accordingly, the ECJ is subject to criticism for not revealing the
basic reasons for its unwillingness to apply GATT law directly. The
primary motivation behind the Court's refusal to directly apply GATT
law in the Community on a unilateral basis, is the fact that other WTO
Members do not directly apply it. Such a unilateral approach would
restrict the ability of those Community institutions that perform executive
functions to exercise discretion in handling foreign commercial policy.
Even if trade liberalization is done only on a unilateral basis, economic
theory predicts welfare gains. In summary, the ECJ's reasoning seems
to be a more policy-oriented approach than one based on strict legal
construction.
The case law of the ECJ considerably weakens the effective applica-
tion of GATT law within the European Community. The famous "grass-
roots-enforcement" which has contributed to the acceptance and overall
success of EC law will not occur with GATT if individuals cannot rely
on proper respect for GATT law in the operation of the CCP. A system
providing for direct application of GATT law is likely to be less protec-
tionist than a system in which violations of GATT law cannot be chal-
lenged before the courts. It has never been argued that direct application
of GATT law by the EC courts would lead to more protectionist results
as in U.S. courts. 6
Another criticism relates to the specific institutional structure of the
European Community and to the fact that the Community could only
become a Member of the WTO simultaneously with its Member States
55. Cf. lwasawa, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 50, at 360; Meng, supra note 53, at
1078.
56. See Robert Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign Trade
Policies, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 9, at 503, 508.
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(Article IX of the Agreement). Thus, where the European Community
itself engages in conduct which violates the WTO agreements, EC
Member States could find themselves responsible to third states for EC
violations because they are signatories along with the Community. This
risk is heightened by the fact that the EC Council decides trade matters
by a qualified majority and consults the European Parliament on such
matters on a voluntary basis only. The ECJ could help prevent EC
Member State liability vis-A-vis EC Council actions by accepting the
direct applicability of GATT law and by effectuating the higher status
with respect to secondary EC law (ECT Article 228 paragraph 7).
Finally, by allowing any Member State, when outvoted under ECT
Article 113, to bring a claim of a presumable violation of GATT law by
the EC Council before the ECJ, the ECJ would grant the necessary legal
protection. This legal protection is necessary as all the EC Member
States are apparently liable for any violation of GATT law caused by
acts of the EC.57
A related argument would refer to the infringement procedure under
ECT Article 169, which the EC Commission may initiate against any
Member State violating GATT law. If it is accepted that the EC should
not be held responsible for GATT violations caused by its Member
States, it should likewise be admitted that the Member States should be
in a position to defend themselves against GATT violations by EC
institutions.
It should be noted that GATT law and practice have been rather
flexible in the past. It has been argued that the overall aim and function
of GATT was primarily to create and maintain a mutually advantageous
balance in the field of trade relations amongst the contracting parties,
irrespective of the interests of individual operators.
Only a process of continuing trade negotiations would probably
secure such a balance. However, the general legal principles under GATT
Articles I and III are as precise and unconditional as, for example, the
respective principles under ECT Article 6, 12 or 30. The mere existence
of the authorization to take safeguard measures, or of procedures leading
to decisions containing deviating interpretations, do not constitute valid
arguments for refusing to apply GATT law directly. Thus the ECJ does
accept such direct application within EC law providing for similar
57. Under the practice of GATT never has an EC Member State been addressed under the
dispute settlement procedure with respect to measures decided by the EC.
58. But see Christian Timmermans, L'Uruguay Round: Sa mise en oeuvre par la CE, 3-4
REVUE DU MARCHA UNIQUE EUROPIEN 175, 181 (1994) (not accepting a parallelism between
these two legal situations).
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procedures in order to respond to exceptional situations as, for example,
under ECT Article 36. The same is true with respect to those other
treaties which the ECJ has held to be directly applicable in EC law.
No flexibility seems to be left to the discretion of the contracting
parties if, in a given dispute, a panel procedure has concluded with a
final consent expressed by the GATT Council. The relevant GATT law
will then have been stated and clarified. At least in such a situation the
ECJ would have safe grounds to apply the relevant GATT law directly. 9
The strongest argument for direct application of GATT law may be
based on ECT Article 228 paragraph 7, which binds the EC institutions
and the EC Member States to any international agreement concluded
under the powers of the EC. According to ECT Article 164, the ECJ
must guarantee respect for the rule of law as to the application of the
entire ECT. How then can the ECJ satisfy this requirement when it
would refuse to apply GATT law directly to conflicting EC secondary
law?
All in all, the ECJ, as a "national court" within the GATT system,
does not play any significant role in providing protection and compliance
with GATT obligations. Only when the relevant EC institutions have
expressed their clear intent to act in conformity with GATT law is the
ECJ willing to respect such an intention by construing EC law in confor-
mity with GATT law.
If EC institutions do not express such an intention, the ECJ seems to
follow the approach of the courts of the other contracting parties, which
likewise do not follow the concept of direct application. Thus, refusing
this concept seems to be more the expression of the principle of reciproc-
ity, which in the end would offer the same degree of political flexibility
and discretion as the executives of other GATT contracting parties enjoy.
However, the ECJ has never explicitly referred to this concept of "nega-
tive reciprocity. '"60
Finally, the ECJ has been caught in its own "trap" in that it has
recognized that international treaties concluded by the European Commu-
nity have a higher status than secondary EC law.6' Simultaneously admit-
ting direct applicability and higher status of such agreements would mean
59. See Hans-Dieter Kuschel, Die EG-Bananenmarktordnung vor deutschen Gerichten, 6
EuZW 689, 691 (1995) (considering even unadopted Panel reports to be binding, the accep-
tance of the GATT Council serving only to give permission for measures of retaliation).
60. See Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion of the Results of the
Uruguay Round, supra note 48, at 143.
61. Case 181/73, Haegemann 11, 1974 E.C.R. 449.
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that the ECJ had ruled out any possibility of bending or even breaking
treaty law in case of a conflicting imperative interest of the Community.
If the higher status and the principle of direct application were joined,
the ECJ would always have to rule out any departure from GATT law by
nullifying contradicting decisions under secondary EC law. It has been
convincingly revealed that in national systems accepting a higher status
of treaty law, and thereby affording treaty law a quasi-constitutional
status, the relevant domestic courts have often been somewhat, or even
entirely, reluctant to recognize the concept of direct applicability of the
said agreements. 62
c) The Case Law of National Courts of EC Member States
In principle, national courts of EC Member States should follow the
jurisprudence of the ECJ and avoid issuing decisions which would
necessarily lead to confusion and judicial conflicts. This applies within
each area of EC law. Thus, with respect to international agreements
concluded under the Common Commercial Policy powers, national court
decisions which diverge from ECJ decisions regarding such treaties are
unacceptable. The ECJ has unambiguously ruled in the Chiquita Case on
December 15, 1995, that national courts are not allowed to apply GATT
law directly with respect to individuals.63
However, all EC Member States have been contracting parties to
GATT since even before the European Community was recognized as a
member "sui generis" in 1968. Under Article IX of the WTO Agreement,
the European Community was, for the first time, accepted as a Member
to the WTO alongside the EC Member States. Thus, it is argued that, at
least prior to the WTO, Member States of the European Community
could be held responsible for any violation of GATT law under ECT
Article 234 even if this violation would have been caused by the Com-
munity.64 And even under the regime of the WTO, there is joint liability
of the Community and its Member States, on understanding that-in the
field of its proper exclusive competences-the European Community will
have to be addressed in the first resort by other WTO Members. This
62. Jackson, supra note 53, at 310; see Meinhard Hilf, The Application of GA7T within
the Member States of the European Community, with special reference to the Federal Republic
of Germany, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 153-57 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds.,
1986).
63. Case C-469/93, supra note 52, at 118.
64. EC TREATY art. 234: "The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded
before the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand,
and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this
Treaty."
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requires that national courts of the EC Member States apply GATT law
in a manner which avoids any liability of the Community or of the
respective Member State. For example, a German Finance Court referred
to the ECJ the question whether ECT Article 234 is applicable in the
case of GATT.65 An EC Member State should have the power to fulfill
its obligations under GATT law, which takes precedence over the later-
in-time secondary EC law. Remarkably, this German Finance Court and
the Federal Finance Court which issued an interim decision, held GATT
law to be directly applicable and held that the EC regulation on bananas
is contrary to GATT law.
It is doubtful that the ECJ will follow this reasoning. Instead, it may
be assumed that the ECJ will not accept the argument built on ECT
Article 234. Since 1968, when the CCP became effective, it has been
common practice under GATT that the Community superseded its
Member States in every question relating to the CCP. Thus, in common
agreement with its own Member States as well as with the other contract-
ing parties to GATT, the European Community became the relevant actor
in all questions relating to the CCP. Any dispute settlement procedures
therefore had to be opened, at least in the first resort, against the Com-
munity rather than the EC Member States.'
Therefore, the ECJ may decide that, at least in the field of exclusive
EC competences, the Community will be the only relevant actor within
GATT law, which on the whole will not be considered directly applica-
ble. All Member States would have to strictly follow this approach. Even
within other WTO agreements such as GATS and TRIPS, for which the
EC and its Member States are jointly competent, the ECJ will claim sole
jurisdiction to decide whether this law might have direct applicability
within the EC.67
d) Will the ECJ Accept Direct Applicability
Under the New WTO Rules?
The question remains whether the ECJ might change its reluctant
approach once the new dispute settlement procedure under the WTO
becomes operational, with widespread use and acceptance amongst WTO
Members. Why should GATT law not be directly applicable once the
Appellate Body has issued final and binding decisions on a regular basis?
65. Finanzgericht Hamburg, 6 EuZW 413 (1995). See also Bundesfinanzhof, EWS (1996)
169.
66. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member-Legal Conflicts between
GATT Law and European Community Law, in Hilf, supra note 62, at 23, 45.
67. Case 12/86, Meryen Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gnind, 1987 E.C.R. 3719.
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The always possible negative consensus within the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) under DSU Article 17 paragraph 14 will be rare and should
not be taken into account when qualifying the legal nature of this
strengthened dispute settlement procedure. In general, the legislatures in
other legal systems, such as the EC Council, have the power to "correct"
court decisions if the relevant interpretation relates to the field of second-
ary legislation and not to the area of constitutional law, or in the case of
the EC, to the founding treaties. The WTO Agreement itself provides for
binding interpretations in Article IX paragraph 2 by a three-fourths
majority of the WTO Members.
As the terminology rightly suggests, the Appellate Body obviously
cannot be considered to be a "court" or "tribunal" in the traditional
sense, since the latter would act in a more or even fully transparent
process and offer a high degree of public access to the proceedings.
Thus, the Appellate Body is commonly referred to as a "quasi-judicial
mechanism. '68 As to its main constituting features (such as the profes-
sional quality of its members, their personal and legal independence or
the terms of reference, i.e. the application of the law) or finally the
binding effects of the Appellate Body's decisions,69 there seem to be a
number of important guarantees and conditions that the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism will establish itself as a reliable and recognized
system to assure a rule-oriented observance of the legal disciplines under
the WTO.7 °
However, while the dispute settlement mechanism has gained consid-
erable momentum during the first two years, and the first decisions of the
Appellate Body have been met with overall acceptance and support, it
seems too early to be reassured that this system will guarantee the degree
of stability and predictability necessary to advocate with conviction the
direct applicability of WTO/GATT law by national courts.7 Thus, the
debate will remain open, and is discussed below in more general terms. 72
68. See Christian Timmermans, The Implementation of the Uruguay round by the EC, in
THE URUGUAY ROUND RESULTS 501, 504 (Jacques Borgeois et al. eds., 1995). In public
debate, occasional reference is made to the "World Trade Court." See David E. Sanger,
Playing the Trade Card, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1.
69. See Jackson, supra note 44, at 62.
70. Cf. Pieter Jan Kuyper, The New Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the
Community, 29 J. W. T. 49 (1995).
71. The initial refusal by the United States to accept the panel procedure relating to
measures taken under the Helms-Burton Act has created concern as to the viability of the
system. However, given the growing importance of the WTO and the growing membership
there seem to be likewise growing imperative reasons for a continuing compliance with the
rules agreed upon under the WTO.
72. Cf Phillip Lee & Brian Kennedy, The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in
European Community Law, 30 J. W. T. 67 (1996).
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In all, GATT law will lack a considerable degree of efficiency and
even legitimacy if the given trend of non-applicability should continue.
However, the practice of applying GATT law indirectly still offers
significant potential for effectuating GATT law on the domestic level.
2. Indirect Application of GATT Law
The ECJ will only address arguments based on GATT law where
either the WTO requires national courts to apply GATT law-which it
does not-or where the EC Council, in adopting EC legislation, chose to
fulfill a specific obligation under GATT by referring directly to GATT
law. The latter is the case in the field of calculating customs duties,7 3 as
well as trade barriers legislation 74 and antidumping regulation.75 The ECJ
honored these specific references to GATT law and practice, and ruled
that it can be assumed that the EC Council intended the EC legislation to
be interpreted whenever possible in a manner consistent with the relevant
GATT obligations.
The national courts of EC Member States must follow the ECJ's case
law in applying the relevant EC legislation and GATT law. However,
this rule applies not only to those fields considered to fall within the
exclusive external powers of the European Community, but also to ECJ
cases interpreting the WTO rules for which both the Community and its
Member States retain joint competences (e.g., the GATS and TRIPS
agreements).
Two different approaches to indirect application of GATT law may
be'distinguished. First, the national implementing legislation may either
adopt the GATT language wholesale, or simply refer to specific elements
or parts of GATT law in the legislative history or explanatory statements.
In such cases, the national courts will certainly construe the legislation to
conform as closely as possible to GATT law. The ECJ has followed this
approach most prominently in the field of antidumping. The most con-
spicuous and oft-cited cases in this regard are Nakajima and Extramet,
which together represent a consistent line of jurisprudence.76
Second, even without such direct references to GATT law, national
courts tend to interpret the relevant implementing legislation in a manner
73. Case 92/71, Interfood v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg, 1972' E.C.R. 231; Case 14/69,
Markus v. Hauptzollamt, 1969 E.C.R. 355.
74. Case 70/87, Fediol v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 1781 (relating to the former "New
Trade Instrument").
75. See Case 69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council of European Communities,
1991 E.C.R. 1-2069.
76. See id; see also Case 358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council of the European
Communities, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2501.
[Vol. 18:321
Winter 1997] National Courts in International Trade Relations 347
which avoids conflicts with existing GATT law. This method is referred
to as an interpretation in conformity with GATT law and is well known
in regard to general treaty law and in the special case of GATT law.
Thus, the case law of U.S. courts has interpreted federal statutes in order
to avoid conflicts with GATT law." Courts in Japan are not very
"receptive" to applying international law but similarly accept this ap-
proach of indirect application of GATT law.78
This method of indirect application of GATT law has its merits and
may bring about effects similar to those under a system of direct appli-
cation.79 Courts always look for specific guidance in the implementing
legislation and use their discretion when applying these methods of
indirect application. In the given context it is not possible to offer a
complete survey of indirect application methods used by domestic
courts.
80
IV. OUTLOOK AND PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF
NATIONAL COURTS IN RELATION TO WTO LAW
A. Two Levels of Judicial Review
Lacking Legal Structure
The foregoing considerations have revealed a judicialization of the
international trading system on two distinct levels of international and
national protection. If GATT were a self-contained system, as some
propose, it certainly would not exclude national judicial procedures. As
discussed above, some maintain that GATT needs judicial review on the
grass-roots level of national procedures in order to become more effec-
tive.
The linkage between these two levels is rather undeveloped and has
led to the tentative conclusion that national courts, as well as WTO
Members themselves, are, interwoven in the international trading system
77. See Jackson, supra note 47; Fred Morrison & Robert Hudec, Judicial Protection of
Individual Rights under the Foreign Trade Laws of the United States, in Hilf & Petersmann,
supra note 9, at 91; see also Brand, supra note 47, at 479.
78. See Yuji Iwasawa, Effectuation of International Law in the Municipal Legal Order of
Japan, 4 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 143, 160 (1994).
79. Thomas Oppermann, Die Europaische Gemeinschaft und Union in der
Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), 41 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 919, 928
(1995) (favored as a minimum requirement in order to preserve the legal priority of GATT law
with respect to EC law).
80. For further references regarding Japan, see Iwasawa in Jackson & -Sykes, supra note
50, at 299.
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more in practice than in theory and legal construction.8 There are no
clear rules in international trade law which precisely define the role of
national courts of a WTO Member in providing access to justice for its
nationals. The same is true for foreign nationals from other WTO Mem-
bers who seek equal judicial protection without discrimination.
Thus, in any given antidumping or TRIPS dispute, private parties
may seek relief in national courts of various WTO Members at the same
time as their respective governments become involved in a WTO dispute
settlement procedure. This likely scenario may illustrate a major reason
for hesitating to apply GATT law directly. The fear is that while the
latter could lead to a quick solution, the former, should private parties be
provided with unrestricted access to national courts in offering challenges
under GATT law, could lead to the chaos of private parties filing concur-
rently pending suits in a wide variety of courts. In such a case, the costs
involved could be substantially higher than the presumed benefits of
national judicial review. 2 Nonetheless, no coherent theory exists for
combatting forum shopping and for providing fair and nondiscriminatory
access to the courts of other WTO Members.83
B. Who Will Be the Best Protector of Individual Trading
Rights within the International Trading System?
The thesis of this article is that independent domestic courts would
offer the best guarantee of protecting the interests and rights of individ-
ual operators, thus making the entire GATT system more effective.
However, it may also be argued that (1) governments could provide
better and more effective protection of an individual's rights through the
process of negotiations at the international level, that (2) domestic
legislatures, in passing the implementing legislation, should be responsi-
ble for the protection of the individual's rights, or that (3) the adminis-
trations which execute the respective agreements are best suited to
safeguard the rights and interests of the individual.
The various governments which negotiated the Uruguay Round
deserve credit for having developed the present WTO system, which
represents a successful balance between the contradictory interests of its
Members and various market participants.8 4 This, however, does not
81. STEFAN LANGER, GRUNDLAGEN EINER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG
8, 23 (1995).
82. See generally Jackson, supra note 47.
83. See Petersmann, supra note 1, at 1240.
84. Fred Morrison & Rudiger Wolfrum, The Impact of the Implementation of International
Trade Obligations, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 9, at 519; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
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guarantee a satisfactory implementation and application of the respective
agreements. Moreover, these governments have the authority only to
negotiate, but not finally conclude, such agreements. The final responsi-
bility for the conclusion of agreements such as those of the WTO lies in
the hands of the respective legislatures, which give their consent via the
final process of ratification.85
The role of legislatures in passing legislation is a fundamental pillar
of democratic government. However, these legislatures may only give or
withhold their consent to final trade agreements; they may not alter the
contents of an international agreement once it has been negotiated.
Therefore, legislatures have increasingly tried to become more involved
during the negotiation process, offering their opinions and preferences on
the issues under negotiation. Such prior involvement is necessary as the
executive must have at least a reasonable expectation that the legislature
will ultimately ratify the treaty as negotiated.86 Legislatures of different
WTO Members have also developed techniques to compensate for their
reduced influence by enacting implementing legislation to accompany an
international agreement.
The U.S. Congress may provide a prime example of a legislature
"correcting" agreements negotiated by the executive by means of enact-
ing voluminous implementing laws which may contain more protectionist
attitudes.
In contrast, the legislatures of the EC Member States and the Euro-
pean Parliament have exerted practically no major influence on the
results negotiated by their respective governments. 88 The same seems to
be true for Japan. 89 Accordingly, these legislatures do not seem to have
exerted as much influence on the effective implementation of trade
agreements as the respective administrations which apply the agreements
in daily practice.
It is difficult to generalize regarding the role of the national adminis-
trations which apply the WTO agreements. The structure of a state's
Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Powers?, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note
9, at 537.
85. Robert Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1993) (providing a positive evaluation of the legiti-
mate role of international trade negotiations).
86. See Meinhard Hilf & Frank Burmeister, The German Parliament and European
Integration, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AS CORNERSTONES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 64
(Eivind Smith ed., 1996).
87. Morrison & Hudec, supra note 77, at 118; Leebron, supra note 20, at 241.
88. See generally Jackson & Sykes, supra note 19 (providing detailed analyses of the
respective interests shown by the various legislatures of various WTO Members).
89. See Iwasawa in Jackson & Sykes, supra note 50, at 299.
Michigan Journal of International Law
constitutional system appears to govern the degree of influence its
executive body has on the actual implementation of an agreement. In
particular, Hudec has highlighted the beneficial and balancing influence
of the U.S. administration when confronted with protectionist legislative
acts. The administration normally has a more temperate, flexible, ratio-
nal, and even liberal approach than the U.S. legislature, which appears
more influenced by protectionist interests.9° Furthermore, those adminis-
trations which are not up for re-election do in effect have more opportu-
nities to avoid conflicts of interests faced by the legislature.
The administrations of the European Community and other WTO
Members may be similar. One may assume that, with regard to the
application of international trade agreements, all national administrations
are regularly exposed to protectionist rent-seeking interests and, hopeful-
ly, also to a monitoring control by the legislature. Due to the lack of
direct applicability, administrations are not exposed to a strict control by
domestic courts. Given their variety of options and relatively large
discretionary powers in implementing WTO agreements, national admin-
istrations therefore bear a great deal of responsibility in this area. It
seems that no general conclusion can be drawn as to their degree of
faithfulness in the implementation of the WTO agreements. The possibili-
ty of breaking a treaty is still seen as a political option in cases where an
imperative national interest is at stake. 91 Accordingly, it may be ques-
tioned whether, in the end, national courts are the best guarantors of an
effective and successful international trading system for settling conflicts.
Even with respect to the role of national courts in the implementation
of WTO agreements, there is a certain degree of skepticism. Independent
courts not responsible to any other institution certainly do have the
opportunity to faithfully implement the relevant legislation. However, this
is precisely what is considered by some to be the real danger in relying
too much on the implementing legislation.
For example, in a system like that of the United States in which the
national legislature has tried to "correct" the negotiated agreements by
enacting protective legislation, the courts tend to more faithfully imple-
ment this legislation than the overarching agreements themselves. Thus,
the courts would even apply any "hellfire-and-brimstone" language that
may have appeared in implementing acts, leaving themselves no room to
90. Robert Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign Trade
Policies, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 9, at 503, 516.
91. Discussed by Jackson, supra note 53, at 311, referring to Robert Hudec, Thinking
about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERI-
CA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 113 (Bhagwati & Patrick eds.,
1990).
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maneuver and moderate such legislative language.92 Again, this skepticism
may be particular to the U.S. legal system. It is assumed that a similar
tendency does not exist in other WTO Members to the same extent.
Another skeptical analysis concludes that courts generally tend to
stay away from foreign trade matters. One particular criticism of the ECJ
has been that it allows the EC administration an overly generous margin
of discretion in foreign trade matters. However, a closer analysis of ECJ
case law, particularly that of its most recent decisions, show that this
sweeping criticism is ungrounded. A number of recent ECJ judgments
indicate a willingness on the part of the Court to correct the administra-
tion even when it is exercising its discretion in foreign trade matters.93
However, it certainly would be difficult to show that this reflects a more
general attitude of the ECJ.
Those commentators critical of the courts' willingness to faithfully
apply GATT law acknowledge one exception, referring to the application
of free market principles, such as those under GATT Article I or III or
ECT Article 30. These principles have a different structure in comparison
with certain administrative policies such, as antidumping, subsidies, or
those regarding competition, such as ECT Article 85. For example, only
in the case of free market principles does Hudec expect a purposeful
judicial application.94
This dichotomy between free market principles and redistributive
policies certainly exists. But it is questionable whether the difference
between these two categories justifies a different degree of trust in the
judicial process. Even in the case of the application of free market
principles the judge is often placed in front of divergent concerns of
manifold interest groups. For example, in cases involving ECT Article
30, the ECJ has often had to balance conflicting interests such as those
of environmental protection,95 social goals, 96 and consumer protection. 97
Based on the regular application of the principle of proportionality, the
principle of free market access must often be balanced against conflicting
interests, thereby exposing the ECJ to difficulties similar to those it
experiences in. ruling on administrative decisions conceming redis-
tributive policies.
92. Hudec, supra note 90, at 513.
93. See, e.g., case C-25/94 (19.3.1996)-not yet published-concerning the division of
competences between the EC and its Member States in the framework of the FAO.
94. Hudec, supra note 90, at 509.
95. Case 302/86, Commision v Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
96. See, e.g., Case 145/88, Torfaen Bor Council v. B & Q, 1989 E.C.R. 3851.
97. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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It is therefore maintained that national courts would at least be able
to contribute effectively to the efficient application and implementation
of GATT law regardless of the policies involved. In addition, the in-
volvement of national courts may be considered to be a sort of compen-
sation for the lack of efficient involvement of national parliaments9 8 or
for the lack of involvement of individuals and their interests in the
process of elaboration and negotiation of the respective rules of interna-
tional trade law.99 At any rate, in times of significant and breathtaking
change in international trade relations, governments may be better able,
and thus more legitimate institutions for developing trade policies than
courts. 1°° The latter would always have to respect a large margin of
appreciation in controlling the application of such policies...
C. Prospects for Linking the Two Levels
of Judicial Review
Taking into account the various methods of linkage discussed above,
there may be at least two viable options for linking the intergovernmental
process of dispute settlement under GATT law with the process of
judicial review by national courts: a preliminary procedure for giving
national courts the possibility to obtain advice or guidance from GATT
institutions, or improved access for individuals to the intergovernmental
process.
A third possible avenue, that of introducing the principle of exhaus-
tion of local remedies, should be excluded from the outset; 02 GATT
disputes concern market disruptions and, by their very nature, must be
resolved as quickly as possible. For example, in the case of alleged
dumping, it could be extremely harmful if the dumping were to continue
until the cumbersome and often time-consuming process of judicial
review under national law were concluded. The GATT dispute settlement
process should not be taken "hostage" in the hands of national courts. 103
However, in the field of human rights, which involves matters not
primarily concerned with inter-state disputes, the international process of
98. See Meinhard Hilf, Treaty-Making and Application of Treaties in International Trade
Law: The Case of Germany, in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 9, at 240.
99. Hudec, supra note 90, at p. 507.
100. See Jackson, supra note 53, at 320.
101. See Meng, supra note 53, at 1068.
102. Whether this principle as a principle of customary international law is already part
of GAI law or due to its dispositive nature has been "destroyed" by the practice constantly
followed under the GATT framework is discussed in Pieter Jan Kuyper, The Law of GA7T as
a Special Field of International Law: Ignorance, Further Refinement or Self-Contained System
ofInternational Law, 25 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT'L L. 227, 239 (1994).
103. Petersmann, supra note 1, at 1240.
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judicial review may be inaccessible until after the exhaustion of all local
remedies.
The first option for preliminary involvement of GATT institutions
with respect to procedures pending before national courts presents some
difficulties. To date, a preliminary procedure similar to that of ECT
Article 177 does not exist on a worldwide basis. On the one hand, there
are too many courts amongst the WTO Members. 1 4 On the other hand,
there is no independent court, in the strict sense, on the level of the
WTO.'0 5 If the WTO system would develop further by creating a com-
plete system of judicial review, such preliminary procedures might be
possible.
Alternatively, national courts could be provided the opportunity to
certify questions to the WTO Members, as represented in a rules com-
mittee, in order to get an authentic interpretation of GATT law. Article
IX paragraph 2 of the WTO Agreement provides that the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the "exclusive authority
to adopt interpretations of the Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreement." These decisions are made by a three-fourths majority of the
Members. Another similar procedure is present in the field of the Euro-
pean Community's social security policy where an Administrative Com-
mission, at the demand of national courts, may give binding advice as to
the interpretation of rather complicated rules on social security matters.1°6
A more realistic possibility would be to stay national procedures
pending conclusion of an ongoing GATT dispute settlement process,
which is now characterized by strict time limits and thus might be much
quicker than national procedures. Final decisions from the GATT process
might be considered to have a guiding or even binding effect as to the
interpretation of GATT law. However, it must be considered that so far
in the GATT dispute settlement process, only governments are permitted
to bring and even represent cases. Moreover, the rules on factfinding and
the parties involved in the GATT dispute settlement process are different
than those in national procedures. Nevertheless, the binding effect could
relate merely to legal aspects of GATT law rather than the establishment
of the relevant facts.
104. Kuschel, supra note 59, at 691.
105. The panel procedure does not provide for public hearings. The members of the
panels are not required to be lawyers (see Art. 8 para. I DSU referring only to "well-qualified"
individuals; in contrast, Art. 17 para. 3 DSU states that members of the Appellate Body should
be "persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law").
106. MEINHARD HILF, DIE ORGANISATIONSSTRUKTUR DER EUROPISCHEN GEMEINSCHAF-
TEN 125 (1982).
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A second option would consist in giving individuals easier access to
the GATT dispute settlement process, or at least to the courts of other
WTO Members. The orthodox means by which an individual could gain
access to GATT institutions is through his government's traditional
diplomatic protection. The government then has discretion regarding the
extent to which the individual could be involved in the representation of
his case within GATT institutions. The U.S. implementing legislation
seems to foresee such situations in that it apparently provides affected
private individuals the opportunity to cooperate with the government's
team in representing a case to the GATT panel. 7
Although it would require reforming the entire WTO system, it is
conceivable that there could be a system for direct complaints by indi-
viduals to a WTO Court on International Trade. For example, the ICSID
procedure under the World Bank system provides a forum for individual
complaints against foreign governments. The ICSID system is able to
function because its jurisdiction is of rather limited scope.'08 In contrast,
a similar procedure under the extremely expansive WTO system would
necessitate at least some "certiorari" procedure for the work load to be
manageable. 19
Under the existing system, individuals would benefit from better
access to all relevant information and especially to legal sources under
the WTO system. Were the WTO Secretariat to establish a sort of "center
of information," individuals would gain better access to information and
perhaps would then have a forum to which they could address complaints
to the Secretariat. Such a center could also assist the WTO Secretariat in
fulfilling its obligation to survey the trade policies of WTO Members.
D. Judicial Protection Through Interim Procedures
It is essential that an effective judicial review system include an
interim procedure for urgent legal protection. Such procedures are
common to the systems of all WTO Members, including the European
Community under Art. 186 ECT. Article 50 of TRIPS Agreement
explicitly provides for prompt and effective provisional measures which
should be granted by the national judicial authorities. The WTO dispute
107. See Leebron, supra note 20, at 250.
108. See Convention, supra note 43, at art.25.
109. See generally JOHN JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1984); and Hudec, supra note 90, at
508. See also Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EON. L. 331, 350 (1996); Richard Shell, Trade
Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,
44 DUKE L.J. 829, 902 (1995).
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settlement process does not provide for any similar urgent procedure. At
most Article 4 paragraph 9 of the DSU states that in case of urgency,
including those which concern perishable goods, the parties and the panel
as well as the Appellate Body "shall make every effort to accelerate the
proceedings, to the greatest extent possible."
The WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center is considering intro-
ducing a "facility for emergency interim arbitral relief' where parties
have agreed in their arbitration agreement to apply such a facility."0
Within the European Community, such a procedure is discussed in the
context of the revisions to the founding treaties whether a uniform, and
even exclusive, procedure for interim measures could be introduced
within the provisions setting out the powers of the Court of First In-
stance. However, it seems beyond the reach of the existing WTO system
to install an effective and centralized interim procedure on a worldwide
basis. The national judicial system could provide a stay of a similar
national procedure as long as an urgent procedure under the WTO would
be available on demand of the relevant government of the WTO Mem-
bers.
E. National Courts to Provide Compensation for Their
Government's Failure to Respect GATT Law
WTO Members must fulfill their GATT obligations and perform
according to GATT law. This obligation is fundamental and, where the
state fails to live up to its duties, cannot be replaced by an obligation to
pay compensation, or even by allowing retaliation on the international
level."'
In far-reaching case law, the ECJ has developed the principle that
Member States are responsible vis-a-vis the individual for non-fulfillment
of obligations under EC law. This principle was first developed in the
case of the failure to implement an EC directive within domestic law." 2
Recently, the ECJ broadened the scope of this principle, holding Member
States responsible for the non-fulfillment of EC law in general." 3
If national courts could develop a similar approach for international
obligations under GATT law, it would add considerably to the efficiency
of GATT law implementation. Individuals could thereby claim compen-
110. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Proposed WIPO Supplementary
Emergency Interim Relief Rules, WIPO/ARB/DR 5 (April 19, 1996).
111. For discussion see Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 195 (1994) (statement of John H. Jackson,
Professor of Law, University of Michigan).
112. Cases 6/90 and 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357 (Ct. First
Instance 1991).
113. Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur, 7 EuZW 205 (1996).
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sation from their own government if it has not acted in accordance with
GATT law. However, it seems that hardly any national court is currently
willing to interpret GATT law as creating rights in favor of the individual.
F. The National Judicial Process
Legitimizing the WTO System
In sum, given the various problems discussed above for national
judicial processes with respect to their linkage to the international WTO
dispute settlement system, it seems that major effort should be made on
both national and international levels to provide for more efficient
application of GATT law. Not only would such effort enhance the
efficiency of the WTO system as a whole, but would likewise greatly
strengthen its legitimacy. It is necessary for individuals to accept the
WTO system as legitimate, because without individual acceptance, the
WTO system will be unable to efficiently solve worldwide problems
arising out of the international trading system.
If national courts were empowered to apply GATT law, they would
have an important role because it is through them that individuals would
be able to protect their rights and interests. The citizens of WTO Mem-
bers will only accept repercussions from the WTO's international trading
system, particularly where they are perceived as negative, if the citizens
are confident that their rights and interests are duly protected.
Therefore, future development of the WTO system not only must
improve the dispute settlement procedures, but should first concentrate on
improving national procedures for protecting individual rights and
interests." 4 Only a more effective application of GATT law by national
courts will finally lead to a more effective WTO system and its overall
acceptance."15
Perhaps like the European Community, the WTO should be under-
stood as a system serving in the last resort not only its Members, but
mainly the individual operators in the markets, who by their use of
economic freedoms bring the abstract rules into real application."l 6
114. This recommendation responds to Robert Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute
Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 9 (Michael Hart & Debra Steger eds., 1992).
115. See Timmermans, supra note 68, at 509 (urging that the "Chinese walls" between
both disciplines will have to disappear, referring to the relationship between GATT law and EC
law).
116. See Ronald A. Brand, Private Parties and GA7T Dispute Resolution: Implications
of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J. W. T. 5, 28 (1990)
(stressing the belief in the "value of both democratic political systems and market economics
"that the rules agreed to govern international trade must be considered as the rules of the
people."). See also Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 142 (1992).
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